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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant Arvil A. Harris ("Harris") appeals a final Decision, Order on Supplemental 
Findings, and Judgment and Decree Granting Specific Performance of the Eighth Judicial 
District Court of Duchesne County, State of Utah in favor of Appellee Joseph W. Shields 
("Shields"). The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue #1 
Whether the trial court erred in specifically enforcing a real estate option where the 
purchaser failed to make a valid tender of the purchase price, as required under Utah law. 
Standard of Review and Preservation 
of the Issue for Issue #1 
The first issue should be reviewed for correctness because "when the trial court has based 
its rulings upon a misunderstanding and misapplication of the law, where a correct one would 
have produced a different result, the party adversely affected is entitled to have the error 
rectified in a proper adjudication under correct principles of law." Reed v. Alvey. 610 P.2d 
1374, 1377 (Utah 1980). 
This issue was preserved for appeal in the Bench Trial Tr. (hereafter "Tr.") at 182-8; 
204-08; 294-95. 
Issue #2 
Whether the trial court erred in decreeing that Shields could exercise his option on or 
before "the expiration of the real property lease," contrary to the terms of the option. 
Standard of Review and Preservation 
of the Issue for Issue #2 
The second issue should be determined under a "correction of error" standard because 
"[i]f a contract is unambiguous, interpretation of the contract is a question of law, which we 
review for correctness." Edwards & Daniels Architects. Inc. v. Farmers' Properties. Inc.. 865 
P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
This issue did not have to be raised at trial because the Plaintiff did not seek, as part of 
his requested relief, specific performance contrary to the terms of the contract. This issue first 
arose when the trial court entered its final judgment decreeing performance contrary to the 
contract terms. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
None 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Harris appeals a final judgment and decree of the Honorable John R. Anderson of the 
Eighth Judicial District Court of Duchesne County, State of Utah granting specific performance 
of a real estate option against Harris. This action arises under common law. 
Harris will show that Shields was not entitled to an award of specific performance of the 
Option To Buy where (1) Shields failed to make a valid tender of the purchase price, which 
includes an unconditional offer of payment of the money due, together with the actual production 
of the money or its equivalent, as required for specific performance; (2) the evidence does not 
show that tender would have been futile; and (3) the trial court ordered specific performance 
inconsistent with the parties' agreement. Therefore, this Court should find that the trial court 
committed error in decreeing specific enforcement of the Option To Bu> and deny Shields 
specific performance. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Shields brought an action against Harris to compel specific performance of a real estate 
option. The parties presented evidence and argument at a bench trial on October 17 and 18, 
1994. After hearing the evidence, the trial court took the matter under advisement and then 
issued its Decision on October 24, 1994. The trial court clarified its Decision by an Order on 
Supplemental Findings, dated June 22, 1995, and also issued a Judgment and Decree Granting 
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Specific Performance of the same date. The trial court held that the Option To Buy is definite, 
valid, and enforceable; determined the sales price to be $202,125.00, less all credits and liens; 
and did not require Shields to tender the purchase amount. The Judgment also required Harris 
to sell his property to Shields at a closing date as prayed for by Shields or prior to expiration 
of "the real property lease." 
Harris appealed the trial court's decision to the Utah Supreme Court, which transferred 
the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals. Harris now asks this Court to reverse the trial court 
and deny specific performance of the option to convey real estate. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Harris is the owner of 320 acres of real property, including water shares and an irrigation 
system, located in Pleasant Valley, Duchesne County, State of Utah. (Real Property Lease dated 
May 1, 1987, Add., Doc. 2.) Shields is the owner of real property located three miles away 
from Harris' property. (Tr. at 98.) 
Harris, as lessor, and Shields, as lessee, entered into a five-year real property lease on 
April 1, 1985. (Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 1, 1 1, Add., Doc. 4.) After the 
parties entered into the lease, Harris made substantial improvements on the property, at his own 
expense, in the form of a renovated irrigation system. (Tr. at 116; Findings of Fact & 
Conclusions of Law at 1, 1 1, Add., Doc. 4.) 
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On or about February 10, 1987, the parties mutually agreed to terminate the 1985 lease 
because Harris was interested in selling the property or in obtaining a longer term lease, and 
Shields was interested in purchasing the property or in having a longer term lease. (Tr. at 156; 
Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 2, 1 2, Add., Doc. 4.) As an incentive to induce 
Shields to enter into a longer-term lease or purchase the property, Harris executed an "Option 
To Buy," in writing, on February 12, 1987, and delivered it to Shields. (Tr. at 157-59.) The 
option proposed a new seven-year lease and an option to buy at any time during the seven years. 
The terms of the option are as follows: 
A. Lessee, Joseph W. Shields would have this Special option to buy said ranch 
from Lessor Arvil A. Harris for a reasonable price to be negotiated by five 
independent people, one man from the Federal land Bank, one man from the Soil 
Conservation Service in Roosevelt, Utah office, one banker from the First 
Security Bank of Utah loan department, Roosevelt Utah, one farmer in the 
Myton, Utah area, and one real estate broker in the Myton or Roosevelt area. 
These five people would make a fair study at the time of purchase to make an 
honest and fair appraisal of the ranch. All five bids would be added up for a 
grand total and divided by five to arrive at a selling price. 
B. A special consideration would be given to Joseph W. Shields in that 
$5,000.00 per year would be given toward the down payment at any year during 
the course of the seven year lease. For example, if you choose to buy the 
seventh year of the lease $35,000.00 would be allowed as a down payment 
toward the purchase price of said ranch. Said price of the ranch would be based 
on the appraisal of the five people mentioned in Paragraph A. If for example, 
the average of these five appraisals came to $300,000.00, then you could apply 
the $35,000.00 as part of the down payment. The balance due would be 
$265,000.00. 
(Option To Buy, Addendum, Doc. 1.) 
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On February 20, 1987, Shields filed a Chapter 12 Plan of Reorganization in the United 
States Bankruptcy Court. (Tr. at 126-34.) After the dismissal of the Chapter 12 proceedings, 
approximately 90 days after it was filed, Harris and Shields entered a ten-year lease, which 
began on May 1, 1987 through May 1, 1997, with annual payments of $13,000.00. (Real 
Property Lease dated May 1, 1987, Add., Doc. 2; Tr. at 148-50.) 
The ten-year lease, executed in May of 1987, does not make any reference to the seven-
year option, executed in February of 1987; nor does the Option to Buy refer to the ten-year 
lease. (Option To Buy, Add., Doc 1; Real Property Lease dated May 1, 1987, Add., Doc. 2; 
Tr. at 140.) Furthermore, Shields never discussed the Option to Buy with Harris, nor 
communicated whether he accepted or rejected the option until 1993. (Tr. at 158, 176-77.) 
Shields commenced farming the leased land and made all payments to Harris pursuant 
to the terms of the lease. (Tr. at 112-14; 169.) In the spring of 1993, Harris approached 
Shields and told him that Harris was going to sell the property to Burton Dairy, and Harris 
offered to buy out the remainder of Shield's lease. (Tr. at 142-43.) In response, Shields 
decided to attempt to exercise the Option To Buy to prevent Harris from selling the property to 
someone else and sought the assistance of legal counsel to enforce it. (Tr. at 143-44.) Pursuant 
to the terms of the Option to Buy, Shields obtained four appraisals; he was unsuccessful in 
obtaining the fifth appraisal from the Soil Conservation District. (Tr. at 145-46, 182-83.) 
Shields obtained these appraisals without telling, consulting with, or cooperating with Harris. 
(Tr. at 144-46.) After obtaining the appraisals, Shields had his attorney prepare and mail a 
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letter, dated August 2, 1993, to Harris' attorney, which communicated Shields' intention to 
exercise the option. (Tr. at 177-81.) Based on the appraisals he obtained, Shields asserted that 
the sale price should be $134,200.00. (Complaint, R. at 6.) Although Shields asserted that he 
was ready, willing, and able to purchase Harris' property, Shields never did produce or pay any 
of the purchase money. (Tr. at 146, 183-84.) 
Although the option did not require the parties to cooperate in selecting appraisers or 
specify who was to select the appraisers, after Harris learned that Shields obtained appraisals, 
Harris procured two appraisals. (Tr. at 167-69.) 
The trial court found that "Shields was not required to tender the purchase price under 
the facts and circumstances of this case because the formula for finalizing the purchase price 
could not be completed without the cooperation of both parties as specifically set forth in the 
Option To Buy agreement." (Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 4, 1 17, Add., Doc. 
4.) However, the trial court did not order the parties to cooperate in selecting appraisers to 
value the property. Rather, the trial court averaged an appraisal by a neighbor Shield's selected 
with an appraisal by a neighbor Harris selected to determine one of the required appraised 
values. (Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 5, 119(a), Add., Doc. 4.) The trial court 
did not adhere to the formula set forth in the option in determining this averaged appraisal value. 
(Option To Buy, Add., Doc. 1.) 
The trial court found that the terms of the option were definite, concluded that the Option 
To Buy is valid and enforceable, and ordered Harris to sell the real property to Shields for a 
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purchase price of $202,125.00, less credits and liens, and provide good and marketable title. 
(Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 4, 1 13; 7-8, 112, 6, Add., Doc. 4; J. and Decree 
Granting Specific Performance at 2, 1 2, Add., Doc. 6.) The trial court ordered that the sale 
take place "within such period of time as demanded by the Plaintiff, but not to exceed the date 
of the expiration of the real property lease. . . ." (J. and Decree Granting Specific Performance 
at 2, 1 2 , Add., Doc. 6.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This Court should reverse the trial court's award of specific performance of the real 
estate option to Shields because Shields failed to tender the purchase price, as required under 
Utah Law. Shields alleged that the sale price of Harris' property should be $134,200.00 and 
asked the trial court to order Harris to sell his property to Shields at that amount. Utah courts 
have held that a purchaser seeking specific performance of a real estate contract must make a 
valid tender of the purchase amount before the court can order specific performance, unless the 
purchaser is excused because tender would be a futile act. Shields has not made a valid tender 
of performance, nor does the evidence show that tender would have been futile because Harris 
retained control of and title to his property and could have performed if Shields had tendered 
the purchase price. Therefore, Shields is not entitled to specific enforcement of the Option To 
Buy. 
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In addition, this Court should reverse the trial court's decree which allows specific 
performance to occur at any time prior to "expiration of the real property lease" because the trial 
court awarded Shields a judgment inconsistent with the evidence. Shields prayed for judgment 
conveying Harris' property to Shields pursuant to the terms of the Option To Buy. The trial 
court held that the terms of the option were unambiguous and granted Shields' prayer. 
However, the trial court also ordered that the closing date may not exceed the expiration of "the 
real property lease." By so doing, the trial court added a term which is inconsistent with the 
option and which is not in accord with Shields' requested relief. The only reference to a closing 
date in the Option To Buy is the ability of Shields to exercise the option at any time during "the 
course of the seven year lease." (Option To Buy 1B, Add., Doc. 1.) Harris and Shields never 
entered into a seven-year lease. Nor does the Option To Buy reference the ten-year lease 
entered into by Harris and Shields approximately three months after the option was executed. 
Assuming that the trial court is referring to expiration of the ten-year lease as a closing date, 
then the trial court is supplying a term not included in the option or requested by Shields. A 
court of equity is bound to command present performance of acts in conformity with the 
contract. Here, the trial court ordered Harris to sell to Shields either by a closing date which 
passed prior to judgment or a date not in accord with the parties' contract. 
Consequently, the trial court inappropriately awarded Shields specific performance of the 
real estate option, and this Court should reverse that order by denying specific performance. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
OF THE OPTION TO BUY BECAUSE SHIELDS FAILED TO TENDER 
THE PURCHASE PRICE 
Shields' failure to make a valid tender of the purchase price for Harris' property 
precludes specific enforcement of the Option To Buy. Before specific performance will be 
employed by the courts on a contract for the sale of real estate, the purchaser must show that 
he paid the purchase price or tendered it to the seller. Century 21 All Western Real Estate and 
Investment Inc. v. Webb. 645 P.2d 52, 55-56 (Utah 1982). In Century 21. the Utah Supreme 
Court found that 
During the executory period of a contract whose time of performance is uncertain 
but which contemplates simultaneous performance by both parties, such as the 
Earnest Money agreement involved in this case, neither party can be said to be 
in default (and thus susceptible to a judgment for damages or a decree for specific 
performance) until the other party has tendered his own performance. 
IcL 
Utah's courts have clarified what constitutes a valid tender as follows: "In order to have 
a valid tender, there must be 4a bona fide, unconditional, offer of payment of the amount of 
money due, coupled with an actual production of the money or its equivalent.M Carr v. 
Enoch Smith Co.. 781 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis added) (citing Zion's 
Properties. Inc. v. Holt. 538 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975)); accord Jenkins v. Equipment 
Center. Inc.. 869 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). For further emphasis, the Carr court 
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stated that "[i]t is not enough to simply inform the seller that the buyer is ready and willing to 
perform the contract as planned." Carr, 781 P.2d at 1294. 
The rationale for the tender requirement is that the trial court should be certain that if 
the seller is ordered to perform, the purchaser will be able to pay. Cohen v. Rasner. 624 P.2d 
1006, 1008 (Nev. 1981). In Cohen, purchasers contracted for the sale of two vacant lots and 
construction of apartment buildings on each lot. The contract was contingent on the purchasers 
obtaining the maximum obtainable loan and the sellers carrying the balance. The purchasers 
assumed a loan and obtained a building permit on one of the lots. On the second lot, the 
purchasers applied for a loan, which was never processed, and failed to apply for a building 
permit, which later became unobtainable when Carson City imposed a moratorium on 
construction. The purchasers sought specific performance, which was denied because the 
"buyers' assumption of one loan and their application for another did not constitute performance 
which would entitle appellants to equitable relief because they had not shown their present 
willingness and ability to perform their obligation under the contract." I i . at 1007. Even 
though the purchasers in Cohen did begin financial arrangements for the purchase of real estate, 
their failure to complete the financial arrangements before seeking specific performance 
precluded their relief. 
In Carr. the plaintiff entered into an earnest money agreement to purchase a home to be 
built as part of a housing development and paid $1,000.00 as a down payment. Without any 
notice to the purchaser, the seller revised the construction of the home to make it suitable for 
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use as a model home by a real estate agency and returned the purchaser's earnest money deposit. 
Whereupon, the purchaser had his attorney send a letter to the real estate agency, which 
expressed the purchaser's intent to perform under the contract. In response, the seller informed 
the purchaser that the seller considered their agreement to be terminated by the purchaser's 
failure to obtain a loan for the residence. Then, the purchaser sued for specific performance, 
seeking to force the seller to convey the home to the purchaser, rather than allowing the 
residence to be used by the real estate agency as a model home. The purchaser based his action 
upon two arguments: (1) the purchaser did make a valid tender by his letter expressing his 
intent to perform the contract; and (2) the purchaser argued that the tender requirement was 
excused because the seller had repudiated the contract by committing the home for use as a 
model home. 
Both the trial court and the appellate court found no merit to the purchaser's first 
argument because the purchaser failed to satisfy his tender obligation by simply serving a notice 
of his willingness to proceed. Carr. 781 P.2d at 1294. The Carr court explained that Mthe 
requirement of a tender is well-established," and for a valid tender, the purchaser must 
unconditionally offer payment of the money due, plus actually produce the money. IcL The 
Carr court determined that the purchaser's letter expressing his intent to perform the contract 
tfat most expressed a desire on the part of Carr to go forward. . . [and] cannot be viewed as 
satisfying the tender requirement." Id, 
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Carr's second argument, that tender was excused, also failed. Utah courts recognize that 
tender may only be excused where a party demonstrates by "reasonably plain and clear" 
evidence that tender would have been a futile act. Id. at 1295. The Carr court explained the 
rule of law as follows: 
[t]he familiar rule that the law does not require one to do a vain or useless thing 
excuses the making of a formal tender which would otherwise be required, where 
it is reasonably plain and clear that if made, such a tender would be an idle 
ceremony and of no avail, as where it appears that a tender, if made, will be 
refused for some reason unrelated to the tender or its sufficiency. . . . 
Id. (citations omitted). 
In Carr. the evidence showed that although the seller allowed a real estate agency to use 
the house as a model home, such use did not place it beyond the seller's control. The seller did 
not convey title, and no evidence suggested that the alterations in the construction of the home 
could not have been corrected for the purchaser's use. IcL The Carr court held that from this 
evidence, "the record is not so 'reasonably plain and clear' as to demonstrate that tender would 
have been a futile act." IcL Based on the evidence before the court, the seller could have 
performed his obligations had the purchaser tendered the balance of the purchase price. Whether 
the seller would have performed or even wanted to perform was irrelevant. The court only 
focused on whether the seller was capable of performing had the seller produced the money in 
conjunction with the tender offer. The Carr court concluded that the purchaser's duty to tender 
was neither performed nor excused; therefore, the purchaser was not entitled to specific 
performance. Id 
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The Carr case closely parallels Harris' case. In both cases, the parties contracted for real 
estate. In the Carr case, it was pursuant to an earnest money agreement, and in Harris' case it 
was pursuant to an option. In addition, both purchasers had their attorneys inform the sellers 
that the purchasers were ready, willing, and able to perform the contracts. Nevertheless, both 
purchasers failed to actually pay any purchase money. In Carr. the purchaser did not tender 
payment either before or after construction of the home. In Harris' case, although Shields 
obtained appraisals to figure the purchase price, Shields failed to unconditionally offer payment 
of the purchase amount and produce that amount of money due or its equivalent. 
Then, in both cases, the evidence failed to demonstrate that tender would have been 
futile. In Carr. the evidence showed that the realty was not placed beyond the control of the 
seller. The use of the home as a model was at the pleasure of the seller, the seller had not 
conveyed title, and any corrections in construction could have been appropriately made. Even 
though the seller refused to convey the residence when requested to do so by the purchaser, the 
seller still was capable of performing; he retained title and the construction was finished. In 
Harris' case, Harris had not conveyed title, Harris retained control of the land, Harris had not 
terminated the lease with Shields, and Shields continued to farm the land. Although Harris 
desired to sell his property to Burton Dairy and offered to purchase Shields' remaining lease 
term, Harris still retained control of the property, had not repudiated the contract, and would 
have been able to perform if Shields had tendered payment, even though Harris, like the seller 
in Carr. did not want to. 
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Moreover in Harris' case, the trial court did not follow the established law that a 
purchaser must tender the purchase amount or show that he was excused from tender because 
of the futility of such an act. In Harris' case, the trial court made no findings or conclusions 
that Shields was excused from tender because such an act would have been futile. Rather, the 
trial court found that Shields was excused from tendering the purchase amount "because the 
formula for finalizing the purchase price could not be completed without the cooperation of both 
parties as specifically set forth in the Option To Buy agreement." (Findings of Fact & 
Conclusions of Law at 4, 117, Add., Doc. 4.) Contrary to the trial court's findings, the option 
does not require the parties to cooperate in obtaining appraisals; it only requires that appraisals 
be obtained. (Option To Buy, Add., Doc. 1.) Nevertheless, under Utah law, the only excuse 
for failing to tender is where the evidence is reasonably plain and clear that an actual tender 
would have been a futile act. Carr, 781 P.2d at 1295. Like the seller in Carr, Harris has done 
nothing in this case to excuse Shields' tender. 
Because the Harris case so closely parallels the Carr case, this Court should similarly 
decide that Shields' duty to tender was neither performed nor excused and Shields is not entitled 
to specific performance. 
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H. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
INCONSISTENT WITH THE PARTIES' CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT 
Shields is not entitled to specific performance of the real estate option because the trial 
court supplied a term inconsistent with the Option To Buy. In cases involving specific 
performance of a real estate sale agreement, w[s]pecific performance may be granted only if the 
parties' intent as to the essential terms of the agreement is clear." Barnard v. Barnard. 700 P.2d 
1113, 1114 (Utah 1985). Then, when granting specific performance, "it is the obligation of the 
courts to evaluate the equities of the parties and to formulate a remedy that seeks to place the 
parties in a position as similar as possible to that which they would have been in had the 
conveyance been made according to the terms of the contract." Eliason v. Watts. 615 P.2d 427, 
430 (Utah 1980). Consequently, when a court decrees specific performance of a real estate 
agreement, the court must 
require the performance of some certain and specific act which ought to be 
performed by the delinquent party, and it cannot enter a general decree that in the 
future the delinquent party shall perform the acts required of him by his contract. 
In entering a decree of specific performance, the court has no power to command 
the performance of acts except in accordance with the contract. 
71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Performance § 221 (1973). 
In the instant case, Shields petitioned the trial court for specific enforcement of the 
Option To Buy. The trial court found that the "[t]erms of the option agreement were definite 
and enforceable11 and held that the option was valid and enforceable. (Findings of Fact & 
Conclusions of Law at 4, \ 13; 7, \ 2, Add., Doc. 4.) Therefore, the trial court was bound to 
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interpret the contract according to the document itself. Reed v. Davis County School District. 
892 P.2d 1063, 1064-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see also Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co.. 
603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979) (stating "A court will not rewrite an unambiguous contract."); 
Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd.. 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980) (explaining that WA court will 
not enforce asserted rights that are not supported by the contract itself.11). 
The Option To Buy, dated February 10, 1987, refers to a seven-year lease, which the 
parties never entered into. Several months afterward, the parties actually entered into a ten-year 
lease, which expires on May 1, 1997. The option does not refer to this ten-year lease, nor does 
the ten-year lease refer to the option. The option, itself, clearly does not give Shields any right 
to a ten-year option. 
In ordering Harris to sell his property to Shields, the trial court decreed that the closing 
date of the option would be pursuant to the terms of the Option To Buy, ffbut not to exceed the 
date of the expiration of the real property lease. . . ." (J. and Decree Granting Specific 
Performance at 2, 12 , Add., Doc. 6.) The trial court never clarified which real property lease 
it referred to, and maybe with some justification. The trial court could not rule that the lease 
referred to is the seven-year lease because no such lease existed. Nor could the trial court rule 
that the lease referred to is the ten-year lease because the court found that the terms of the option 
were unambiguous, and the option does not reference a ten-year lease at all. The obvious 
problem is that the option, which was offered by Harris several months prior to execution of the 
ten-year lease, by its terms has no connection to anything other than a seven-year lease. 
17 
Not only did the trial court order Harris to perform on a date that had already past, but 
the trial court exceeded its authority in extending the closing date beyond that prayed for and 
contractually agreed upon. The trial court held that the terms of the option were clear, valid, 
and enforceable. By its terms, the Option To Buy was enforceable only in conjunction with a 
seven-year lease that never existed. Accordingly, the trial court committed error in attempting 
to tie the option to a lease not supported by the option itself. Thus, this Court should reverse 
the trial court's decree of specific performance of the Option To Buy. 
CONCLUSION 
Shields is not entitled to specific performance of the Option To Buy because he failed to 
satisfy a condition precedent set forth by Utah's courts which requires a purchaser to tender the 
actual purchase money before specific performance is decreed. Shields' failure to actually pay 
the purchase price of the real property to Harris precludes Shields from specific enforcement of 
the option. 
In addition, the trial court erroneously excused Shields from tendering the purchase 
money based upon an excuse not recognized by Utah's courts and based upon an erroneous 
interpretation of the Option To Buy. The evidence does not reasonably and clearly show that 
if Shields would have made a tender of the purchase price it would have been a futile act. 
Harris retained control of and title to his property and was capable of performing had Shields 
tendered the purchase price. Furthermore, the trial court ordered performance of the option on 
18 
a date that expired prior to trial and on a date that the trial court supplied in contravention of 
a contractual term in an unambiguous contract. Specific enforcement of an unambiguous real 
estate option requires specific performance in accord with the contract terms, and this 
unambiguous option references a seven-year lease, not a ten-year lease. 
Based on the foregoing facts and arguments, Harris urges this Court to reverse the trial 
court's ruling specifically enforcing the Option To Buy and deny specific performance. 
DATED this U> day of March, 1996. 
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
James L. Christensen 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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DOCUMENT 1 
tNTRT NO. 3 3 2 5 ! E 9 D A T E ££jz<Z3 TIME 3jJ*p~j ^QOY. &£!(— rAGb*3i3-3<fif 
FEE %^J1 RECORKD AT REQUEST O F _ j J ^ . ^ i ^ ^ 
DUCHESNE COUNTY RECORDER DBHJT 
OPTION TO BUY 
A . L e s s e e , J o s e p h U). S h i e l d s w o u l d haa ,e t h i s S p e c i a l !•(. t i 
t o bu> s a i d r a n c h - f rom L e s s o r M r " i 1 A . H ? r r i s t o r a 
r e a s o n a b l e or i c e t o be n e g o t i a t e d b •> -f i •• e • n d e p e n d e n t 
p e o p l e , one man - f rom t h e F e d e r a l l a n d Ban!* , one man t r o m t 
S o i l C o n s e r v a t i o n S e r v i c e i n P o o s e v e l t , U t a h o f f i c e , one 
b a n k e r -from t h e F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank o-f U t a h l o a n dep ar t -men 
R o o s e v e l t U t a h , one - f a rmer i n t h e M > t o n , U t a h a r e a , and on 
r e a l e s t a t e b r o k e r i n t h e M ' t o n or F o o = e " e l t a r e a . T h e s e 
-f i • • e p e o p l e w o u l d make a - f a i r s t u d - a t t h e t i m e o-f p u r c h a s 
t o make an h o n e s t and - f a i r a p p r a i s a l o f t h e r a n c h . M 1 1 +1 
b i d s w o u l d be a d d e d up -for a g r a n d t o t a l a n d d i v i d e d b ' T I 
t o a r r i v e ^ ^ a s e l l i n g p r i c e . 
on 
he 
I 1 P 
P. A s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n w o u l d b* g i v e n +o J o s e p h M. 
S h i e l d s i n t h a t $ 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 p e r y e a r M o u l d be g i v ^ n t o M a r d t h e 
down p a y m e n t a t a n / y e a r d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o-f t h e s e M e n v e a r 
l e a s e . For e x a m p l e , i -f / o u c h o o s e t o b u y t h e s e v e n t h / e a r 
o f t h e l e a s e $ 3 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 w o u l d be a l l o w e d as a down p a y m e n t 
t o w a r d t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e o-f s a i d r a n c h . S a i d p r i c e o-f t h e 
r a n c h w o u l d be b a s e d on t h e a p p r a i s a l o f t h e - t i ^ e p e o p l e 
m e n t i o n e d i n P a r a g r a p h A . I f f o r e ' a m p l e , t h e a M e r a g e o+ 
t h e s e f i v e a p p r a i s a l s came t o $ r 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , t h e n -ou c o u l d 
a p p l y t h e $ ^ 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 as p a r t o f t h e down p a y m e n t . The 
b a l a n c e due w o u l d be S 2 6 5 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
Subscribed before me t h i s 
n r " i 1 H 7 H a r r i s sK 
It' day of y\/jjl**^tS^y 
\Jt4t\^tl ^<y^\. 
M ~ •- ~ — ~ n i l 
DOCUMENT 2 
REAL PROPERTY LEASE 
THIS AGREEMENT entered into this 1st day of May, 1987, by 
and between ARVIL A- HARRIS, hereinafter referred to as Lessor, 
and JOSEPH W. SHIELDS, hereinafter referred to as Lessee, for and 
in consideration of the mutual covenants hereinafter set forth, 
do hereby agree as follows: 
WHEREAS, Lessor is the owner of 320 acres of real property 
located in Pleasant Valley, Duchesne County, State of ULah, mGre 
particularly described as follows: 
TOWNSHIP 8 SOUTH, RANGE 17 EAST, U.5.M, 
Section 21: Southeast Quarter. 
Section 27: West half Northwest Quarter. 
Section 28: North half Northeast Quarter 
Together with all improvements and appurtenances thereunto 
belonging and 250 shares of the capital stock in the Uintah 
Basin Irrigation Company; and 
WHEREAS, Lessor is the owner of an underground water system, 
and seven wheel lines, all of which are now in good condition; 
and 
WHEREAS, Lessee desires to lease said property, together 
with such water shares and personal property as above described 
from Lessor. 
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the above, Lessor and Lessee do 
hereby agree as follows: 
1. Lessor shal1: 
a. Pay all real property taxes on said property. 
b. Pay all water assessments in regard to said 
property. 
2. Lessee shall: 
a. Furnish all said personal property, which includes 
seven water lines, which lines, etc. shall be 
returned to Lessor, at the expiration of this 
lease, in as good of condition as they are 
presently, which condition is good, reasonable 
wear and tear excepted. 
d. Pay all utilities, which includes electricity. 
3- Regarding the water pumps and underground lines, Lessor 
Lessor shall be responsible for the repair of the same. 
This lease shall be for a ten (10) year term, beginning May 
1, 1987, through May 1, 1997. The payments under this lease 
shall be made in annual installments of £13,000.00, the first 
being due on May 1, 19B7, and continuing annually thereafter 
during the ten year term. Payment on lease is due and payable 
•* h e first of May each year, with a $0 day grace period. 
Lessee further agrees to deliver up the said premises to 
Lessor, at the expiration of this lease, in as good of order and 
condition as when the same wis entered into by Lessee, reasonable 
wear and tear, damage by the elements excepted and the Lessee 
will not let or underlet said premises, or any part thereof, 
without the written consent of Lessor first had and obtained, 
which consent will not be unreasonably withheld. Lessee notes 
that 3/4 of property now needs plowed crops rotated and replanted 
into alfalfa. The Lessor agrees to pay for 1/2 of all alfalfa 
seed for the duration of the lease, which can be deducted from 
the lease payment by the Lessor. 
In case of failure to faithfully perform the covenants and 
terms herein set forth, the defaulting party shall pay all costs, 
expenses and a reasonable attorney's fee resulting in enforcing 
this agreement or any right arising out of such breach. 
Each party hereunder shall be responsible for losses 
resulting from negligence or misconduct of themselves, their 
employees or invitees, holding the other party harmless 
therefrom. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties have hereunto set their 
hands and seals the day and year first above written. 
LESSOR: 
ARVIL A. HARRIS 
LESSEE: 
feEPH/w. S H I E L D S 
STATE CF UTAH 
CiA-MTY OF SALT LAKE 
l-fftREBY CERTIFY THI9 TO BE A TKU5 
AND CORRECT COPY OF THE ORIGINAL 
W£IPWpNT. / ^ 
NOTARY FVBO& , ^ - 7 , . . , / / 
RESIDING »N V Y / A v ' n ^ / / •/. 1 / 
JLX/Xi-ito / -£i 7 - <-/;;; 
DOCUMENT 3 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
in and for Duchesne County and the State of Utah 
Duchesne Department 
JOSEPH W. SHIELDS, 
plaintiff 
ARVIL A. HARRIS, 
defendant 
D E C I S I O N 
Civil No. 940800002PR 
Judge John R> Anderson 
R U L I N G 
The above captioned matter having come on regularly for trial the 17th and 18th days 
of October, before the Honorable John R. Anderson, setting without a jury. Evidence 
having been adduced and argument having been made and the court having taken the matter 
under advisement now makes and enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Decision: 
FINDINGS 
The parties to this law suit hereafter referred to as Shields and Harris entered into a 
five (5) year real property lease un April 1, 1985. Because of the economics presented by 
the condition of the property, substantial improvements were made at Harris's expense. 
2. On ur about February 9, 1987 the parties mutually agreed to terminate the lease. 
3. Harris was interested in selling the property or in obtaining a long term lease to 
coyer his investment costs and Shields was interested in purchasing the property or in having 
a longer term lease. 
4. The parties being in conceptual agreement toward their expectations on or about 
the date of the termination of the short term lease. 
M/h 
5. Shields and Harris are both held by this court to be above the standard of 
consumers. To borrow from the uniform Commercial Code special recognition is given to 
farmers as merchants and from (lie testimony adduced, Harris was an experienced and 
successful businessman. This court will not hold the parties however, to standards of 
knowledge required for real estate brokers or attorneys trained in the special areas of real 
estate law. 
6. Shields was faced with having to file a chapter 12 Plan of Reorganization in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court at or near this time. 
7. From the documents filed with the bankruptcy court, it is apparent to this court 
that Shields intended to enter into a long term lease or to buy the property. 
8. At or about the date of the filing of the chapter 12 Petition, Harris granted shields 
an opLion to buy the property. 
9. This court finds from the testimony adduced that, the option extended from Harris 
to Shields was a * dangling carrot" to induce Shields to enter into a longer term lease. 
10. The option given was therefore for a valuable consideration 
11. Alter the dismissal of the Chapter 12 proceedings approximately 90 days after it 
had been filed, Harris received from Shields an executed ten (10) year lease pursuant to the 
evidence adduced and the exhibits received. 
12. The option contract was not a mere continuing offer, but an interest in real 
estate. 
13. Terms of the option agreement were definite and enforceable and will be 
construed against Harris who drafted the document. "Ranch" will include the water stock 
according to customs and dealings of the parties. 
Id. No evidence was presented \m Harris's counterclaim and therefore it should be 
dismissed. 
15. The ten year lease and the option agreement were not merged, therefore this 
court finds that there is no provision for the award of attorney fees for enforcing the option 
contiaa. 
16. This court finds based upon the appropriate case law. and the facts adduced at 
trial in this case that marketable title need not be such till actual date of closing. 
17. Tender of a purchase price was not required under the circumstances because the 
formula for completing die purchase price could not be completed without cooperation 
1 
between the parties. Because the parties were held to the standard of merchants good faith 
and fair dealing will be implied in their transactions* 
18. Since the 5th element of the determination of value was an impossibility the court 
will not simply exclude its operation from the contract. 
19. The court will try and construe the contract without re-writing the contract 
reading in to the contract a requirement of good faith and fair dealing which is required 
between these parties The court is determined that the sales price formula will be 
determined as follows: 
1. It will be the average of two (2) farmers and neighbors obtained by each 
of the parties, Richens and Roberts. 
2. Court will use the Federal Tand Bank appraiser of Mr. Warren. 
3. The court will use the First Security Bank value 
4. The court will use die average of a real estate broker supplied by 
each of the parties. Those numbers totaled equal $227,500 divided by four (4) 
equals $197,000.00. The court will assign a value to the sprinkler system 
which is removable from the property and not deemed fixtures to the eight 
wheel lines of $8,000,00. Re: value of sprinklers lines, Plaintiff's testimony 
is inconclusive and Wilkersons @ $27,000.00. With defendants at $10,000, 
5. Court will exclude the Burton Dairy Deal as 
a) Not done 
b) Not relevant to coniract interpretation. 
20. Therefore, the Yalue of die property and the purchase price determined from the 
contract is $207,000.00. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The counterclaim of Harris is dismissed. 
2. The option agreement extended by Harris to Shields is valid and enforceable. 
Harris must furnish marketable title al date of closing. The purchase price will be 
$207,000.00. less credits and liens.. 
3. Judgment may be entered accordingly, counsel for Shields is directed to prepare 
inclusive Findings uf Facts and Conclusions of Law and a Decree. Present the some to 
counsel for Harris for approval as to form and present it to the court, whereupon judgment 
may be entered. 
Dated J6 * i*Tl , 1994. 
lonorable John R. Anderson 
copy to: 
Richard K, Nebeker 
James L. Christensen 
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i FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
t CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
l
Civil No. 940800002PR 
; Judge John R. Anderaon 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on 
j the 17th and 18th daye of October, 1994, before the Honorable John j 
J, R. Anderson, presiding* From the evidence presented and argument! 
j; made at trial, the court rendered a memorandum "Dealsion" on the j 
>| 24th day of October, 1994. Based upon the Court's Deoieion, with 
r its accompanying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
:j parties hereto (hereafter, "Shields" and "HarrisM), by and through 
|j counsel of record, now set forth the inclusive Findings of Fact and 
is 
j! Conclusions of Law; 
r 
J. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties to this law suit entered into a five 
(5) year real property lease on April 1, 1985. Because of the 
20., 
Findings of Fact and Conelot ions of Law -
Caoo N O . O40800002W ? 
Judge John ft. Anderson j 
economics presented by the condition of the property, substantial 
\\ improvements were made at Harris' expense. j 
i: ! 
!• 2. On or about February 9, 1987, the parties mutually; 
j agreed to terminate the 1085 lease. j 
3. Harris was interested in selling the property or in ' 
obtaining a long term lease to cover his investment costs and; 
; Shields was interested in purchasing the property or in having a ! 
longer term lease. ] 
4• The parties, being in conceptual agreement toward j 
their expectations on or about the date of the termination of the I 
:
 1985 lease, determined to enter into a long-term lease. ThiB long ; 
i ' i 
; term lease, (for a period of ten years), was entered into between; 
# 
;« shields and Harris on or about the let day of Hay 1987. j 
I j 4 
5. Both Shields and Harris are found to be above the j 
\\ standard of consumers as designated by the uniform Commercial Code. | 
;
 Harris is found to be an experienced and successful businessman, j 
•;, The parties are not however to be held to the standard of knowledge j 
'• required for real estate brokers or attorneys trained in the j 
; special areas of real estate law* j 
6. At or near the time of entering the new lease with! 
i Harris, Shields was faced with having to file a Chapter 12 Plan of j 
204 
Finding* of Fact and Conclusions of Low I 
CAM No. 94080D0Q2W 
Judo* John 1. Andtrton 
Reorganisation in the United States Bankruptcy Court. ! 
7. From the documents filed with the Bankruptcy Court, j 
it is apparent that Shields intended to enter into a long term j 
lease with Harris ana/or to buy the property, I 
8. At or about the time of the filing of the Chapter 12 , 
Petition, Harris granted Shields an option to buy the property. The j 
"Option To Buy" agreement was given in writing, executed by Mr. j 
Arvil A Harris and delivered to Mr. Shields. 
9. The "Option To Buy" granted by Harris to Shields I 
constituted an incentive or a "dangling carrot" to induce Shields j 
to enter into the ten year May 1, 1987 lease with Harris, Shields j 
relied upon the option TO Buy when entering the ten year lease. j 
10. The "Option To Buy" agreement was given for valuable •' 
i 
consideration, j 
11. After the dismissal of the Chapter 12 proceedings ; 
(approximately 90 days after it was filed), Harris received from! 
Shields the executed ten (10) year lease. Shields commenced farming 
the leased land and made all payments to Harris pursuant to the 
lease. j 
12. The "option To Buy" contract was not a mere' 
i 
continuing offer, but an interest in real property belonging to I 
3 
20, 
Flndtagt of Fact wnti Conclu«iarw of le* 
C I M NO. 940800002PR 
Juefee John R. And»r«flo 
Shie lds• 
13. Terms of the option agreement were definite and « 
enforceable and are construed against KarriB who drafted the 
document. The tern "ranch" ae used In the lease ana or option, t 
i 
includes the water stock according to the customs and dealings of i 
the parties* 
i 
14. No evidence was presented on the Harris Counterclaim ; 
and the same is to be dismissed. 
15. The ten year lease and the option agreement were not ] 
merged and therefore/ there is no provision for the award of ' 
attorney fees for enforcing the option agreement. 
16. Based upon appropriate case law and the facts 
j adduced at trial in this case, marketable title need not be j 
j, available until the actual date of closing. 
:| 17. shields was not required to tender the purchase' 
'j price under the facts and circumstances of this case because the j 
'• formula for finalizing the purchase price could not be completed i 
, without the cooperation of both parties as specifically set forth 5 
'i ; 
1
 in the Option To Buy agreement. Since both parties are held to the j 
> standard of merchants, good faith and fair dealing is implied In 
t I 
1
 their transactions. 
4 
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Finding* of Pact and Conclueioc* of l«u j 
C1M *©. 940800003* ' 
Judge John K, Anderson , 
18. Because It was impossible to obtain an appraisal by 
someone from the Roosevelt offloe of the Soil Conservation Service , 
(the fifth appraisal in the option formula for determining value i 
and sale price), that element of value determination is excluded by I 
the Court. 
19. The formula for price determination as set forth in 
i 
the Option To Buy agreement will be construed by the Court without 
re-writing the contract. Based upon the requirement of good faith -
and fair dealing between the parties, the option agreement sales ; 
price is found to be the average price at which the property was * 
appraised, plus the value of the non-fixture sprinkler system,
 : 
determined as follows: j 
a. The average of the values placed on the j 
property by two (2) farmers and neighbors, Mr. Rlchens and Mr. j 
Roberts, one each obtained by each of the parties, in the amount of j 
$140,000.00 and $280,000.00 respectively, equals $420,000.00, j 
j 
divided by two equals: s210.000.00. | 
b. The Federal Land Bank appraisal of S190r000.00. > 
o. The First Security Bank appraisal of 6177,750.00. ; 
! 
d. The average of the values placed on the property I 
by the two (2) real estate brokers' appraisals, each party having' 
5 
2C-< 
FfndfngA of Fact and Conclusion* of lau [ 
Cue No. W800003P*
 ; 
Judge John ft* Anderson j 
provided one of the brokers is $245,500,00 (the Roberts appraisal] 
;; aa given in oral testimony at court) and $160,000.00 (the Allred I 
i i 
I . 4 
,: appraisal) equals $405,500.00 divided by two equals 6202.750.00. 
o. The sum of the above appraisals is $780,500 j 
J
' ($210,000.00 t $190,000.00 + $177,750.00 + $202,750) and when: 
i i 
I; divided by 4 that equals $195,125.00. ' 
i j 
;: f. The value of the sprinkler system which is ; 
i removable and not deemed to bs a fixture to the eight wheel lines 
i 
is the sum of $8,000.00* j 
g. The Burton Dairy deal is not included in the j 
value determination because the deal was not completed and evidence i 
!i ! 
'; related thereto was not relevant to the contract. j 
j! ' 
;! 20. The total value of the property and the purchase; 
j|
 price to be paid pursuant to the parties contract is therefore the ; 
sum of $202,125.00. 
6 
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Findings of Fact and Conelutlons of Law 
Cooo No. 94080000** ! 
Judge John fU Ancferton ! 
i 
21. There exists some liens and encumbrances on the ' 
i i 
i I 
i title to the leased property Which will be removed at the expense ! 
• of Harris or in the alternative, deducted from the purchase price 
lj 
11 at the time of closing. 
;| 22. The Plaintiff Shields is entitled to a credit on the 
ji 
jj purchase price of 35,000.00 per year for each year paid on the 
[' lease pursuant to the terms of the option contract* 
i 
CONCLUSIONS OP IAW 
i 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties in the 
» 
i above-entitled matter and subject matter jurisdiction exists* The 
•i real property which is the subject of this legal action is located j 
*! \ 
j| within the Eighth District Court of Duchesne County. 
i\ 2. The option To Buy agreement given by Harris to 
rj 
i* 
\\ Shields is valid and enforceable. 
3. The Option To Buy contract vae not a mere continuing j 
offer, but an Interest in real property belonging to Shields. 
4. Since both parties are held to the standard of 
merchants, good faith and fair dealing is implied in their 
transactions. 
5. Harris must furnish Shields marketable title to the 
7 
20;, 
Finding* of Fact and Conclusion* of Law j 
C « M NO. ttttoooozftft ; 
Judgt Joftn R. Andtrton j 
property at the date of closing, j 
6. The purchase price to be paid by Shields at closing j 
i 
is the priao of $202,125.00 lees all credits and liens. ! 
I 
7. The Burton Dairy Deal is unfinished and not relevant! 
to the option agreement. 
8. There having been no evidence presented on the ; 
1
 Harris Counterclaim, the same should therefore be dismissed. 
9. Plaintiff is entitled to Judgment and Decree of , 
i • 
1
 Specific Performance Ordering that the real property which is the ' 
r subject of this legal action be sold to the Plaintiff by the i 
r i 
j Defendant on the terms and conditions as set forth in these j 
Findings and Conclusions. j 10. Judgment may be entered for Plaintiff accordingly, j 
21G 
finding* of Feet and conelutlona of L M 
Judo* John R. Andtroon 
i 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion© of Law to James j 
L. Christensen at CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN, 39 Exchange Place 
euite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, Attorneys for Defendant, 
this /^ -" day of June, 1995. 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
JOSEPH W. SHIELDS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ARVIL A. HARRIS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON SUPPLEMENTAL 
FINDINGS 
Civil No. 940800002 PR 
Judge John R. Anderson 
* * * * * * * 
Pursuant to the Court's Motion, a post trial status 
conference was held on the 25th day of May, 1995, between 
the Court and the parties in the above entitled case. The 
conference was conducted by telephone and participating in 
the conference call was the Honorable John R. Anderson, 
District Court Judge, Richard K. Nebeker, attorney for 
Plaintiff Joseph W. Shields and James L. Christensen, 
attorney fo£-Defendant Arvil A. Harris. The phone conference 
was conducted by speaker phone and was recorded by the 
Court's reporter• 
The purpose of the status conference was to assist 
counsel in concluding the preparation of the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law by clarifying several points in 
the Court's written "Decision" dated October 24, 1994. 
Counsel and the Court reviewed said Decision and the Court 
referenced to his personal trial notes. Based thereon, and 
pursuant to the records, files and exhibits in this matter, 
and after discussion and argument by counsel, it was 
resolved as follows and is hereby; 
ORDERED 
1. That the appraisal value on the subject real 
property submitted by the witness Mr. L. Clark Roberts, is 
determined to be the amount of $245,500.00. This is the 
amount that he testified to verbally on the witness stand 
and this amount varies from his written opinion. The sale 
price as stated in the Court's written "Decision" dated 
October 24, 1995, shall be and hereby is amended to reflect 
this L. Clark Roberts appraisal value of $245,500.00. 
2. That the phrase, "less credits" as stated in 
paragraph 2 of the Court's written "Decision" under the 
heading "Conclusions" is hereby clarified to mean that the 
Plaintiff is entitled to a credit of $5,000.00 dollars per 
year for each year in which Plaintiff made a lease payment 
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to the Defendant Arvil Harris as outlined in the parties 
option contract. This credit amount shall be deducted from 
the sales price of the real property at the time of the 
closing of the sale between the parties. 
3. Counsel for the parties are to either agree upon the 
Findings Of Fact and Conclusions of Law, or in the 
alternative, submit their own respective Findings Of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law to the Court for approval on or 
before the 9th day of June, 1995. 
Dated this vr- day of June, 1995. 
Honorable John R. Anderson 
Approved: 
Richard K. Nebeker 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
James L. Christensen 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Certificate of Hand Delivery 
I hereby certify to the above entitled Court that I 
hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Order on Supplemental Findings to James L. Christensen at 
Corbridge, Baird and Christensen, 39 Exchange Place, suite 
100, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, attorneys for Defendant, 
this l±T day of June, 1995. ^y^ 
V Richard K. Nebeker 
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Nebeker, McConkie & Wright 
139 East South Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7373 
Attorney for Plaintiff - . . - % . . 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
JOSEPH W. SHIELDS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ARVIL A. HARRIS, 
Defendant• 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE GRANTING 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
Civil No. 940800002 PR 
Judge John R. Anderson 
* * * * * * * 
The above entitled action came on regularly for trial before 
the Hc^i^-li: Jciir. R. Anderson, District Court Judge of the 
Eighth Judicial District Court, sitting without a jury, on the 
17th and 18th days of October, 1994. Plaintiff, Joseph W. Shields 
was present and represented by counsel, Richard K. Nebeker. 
Defendant Arvil A. Harris was present and represented by counsel, 
James L. Christensen. The Court heard the testimony of the 
parties and their witnesses, examined the exhibits admitted into 
evidence and allowed closing argument by counsel. The matter was 
then taken under advisement and the Court issued it's "Decision" 
memorandum, on the 24th day of October, 1994. The Decision of 
the Court was thereafter clarified by that certain Order on 
Supplemental Findings dated the day of June, 1995. The Court 
being fully advised in the matter and having filed its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and having directed that a Decree 
be entered in accordance with those findings and conclusions; now 
therefore, it is hereby; 
ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
1. That the Plaintiff be and hereby is awarded a Decree of 
Specific Performance requiring that the Defendant sell to the 
Plaintiff the real property which is the subject of this action. 
Said real property is fully identified in the Plaintiff's 
complaint and is set forth on exhibit A attached hereto. 
2. That within such period of time as demanded by the 
Plaintiff, but not to exceed the c.zta of the expiration of the 
real property lease, the real property shall be sold to the 
Plaintiff by the Defendant on the following terms: 
A. The sale price shall be $202,125.00, lawful money 
of the United States of America. 
B. The Defendant shall provide good and marketable 
title to the property, free and clear of all liens and 
2 
encumbrances. Any unpaid liens or encumbrances shall be 
deducted from the purchase price and paid to the respective 
lien holder at the time of closing. 
C. The Plaintiff shall be and hereby is entitled to a 
credit against the purchase price in the amount of $5,000.00 
dollars for each and every year in which the Plaintiff has 
made a lease payment to the Defendant, as stated in the 
parties option contract. 
D. The parties shall select a local title company to 
conduct the closing of the sale, whereupon the purchase 
price less credits and liens shall be paid to the Defendant, 
and a Warranty Deed covering the subject property shall be 
conveyed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff. 
3. In the event of the failure of the Defendant to close the 
sale of the subject property as provided for narein, upon Motion 
by the Plaintiff, an Order of Quiet Title shall issue from this 
Court conveying all right, title and interest in and to tae 
subject property to the Plaintiff, and such additional relief 
shall be granted to carry out this Order and Decree. 
4. The Counterclaim of Defendant Harris against Plaintiff 
Shields shall be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice. 
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5, Each Party is to pay their own respective costs and 
attorney's fees. 
Dated this ?r day of June, 1995. 
. ANDERSON 
! ! • 
Richard K. Nebeker 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
James L. Christensen 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify to the above entitled Court that I mailed a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment and Decree 
Granting Specific Performance to James L. Christensen at 
Corbridge, Baird and Christensen, 39 Exchange Place, suite 100,^ 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, attorneys for Defendant, this 3 ^ ' 
day of June, 1995. ^ 
i / LJli ILL 
Richard K. Nebeker 
